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Up until the recent oil and commodity price crash in 2015, there has been exponential growth in global
shipping and trade, and this increase means that prompt action is required to reduce vessel-sourced
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Future projections suggest that maritime CO2 emissions will increase
substantially by between 50% and 250%. However, there is currently no international instrument holding
global shipping corporations accountable for their vessels' performance in emissions reduction. This
article critically assesses the current accountability practices and regulations in place for these cor-
porations. It suggests that stakeholders in this industry need to further explore the market based me-
chanisms (MBMs) that can encourage and even demand that these corporations systematically disclose
their vessels' emissions reduction performance in an accurate and timely manner. Developing such
mechanisms is vital to assist in the reduction of GHG emissions since a comprehensive international
instrument is unlikely to be implemented soon.
& 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Worldwide shipping trade provides opportunities as well as
challenges in the face of globalization. On one hand, shipping
corporations are expanding sea based cargo shipments [18,57] and
on the other hand, depletion of resources and environmental
pollution caused by vessels is increasing rapidly [67]. Marine
vessels owned and operated by corporations account for about 3%
of total global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions ([49, p.2];
[78,113]). This amount is substantial and growing fast. It is argued
that if no action is taken, the amount will increase to 18% by 2050
[49]. This is counter-productive to international efforts to keep the
global warming temperature increase “to well below 2 °C above
pre industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature
increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels [111, p.2] 1.
Against this backdrop, improving the role of the shipping in-
dustry in the reduction of GHG emissions from marine vessels is a
serious concern (see, for example, [15]). The shipping industry, the
International Maritime Organization (IMO), and governments in
various states work together to minimize such emissions [74] and
the resulting impact on climate change [44,82,91,98]. The Kyoto
Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climater Ltd. This is an open access articl
him).Change (UNFCCC) speciﬁcally urges the developed states to take
the lead to reduce vessel-sourced GHG emissions on a Common
but Differentiated Responsibility (CBDR) principle. However, be-
cause of difﬁculties in allocating and capturing emissions dis-
charges in international sea space, an emissions apportionment is
complex shipping industry (see, for example, [35]). Currently, the
aviation industry appears to be responding with a global trading
scheme for aviation emissions and utilizing sustainable fuels [14].
Complicating the implementation of similar market based me-
chanisms with shipping are the tension between CBDR which al-
lows for different levels of effort tied with economic development
and the maritime principle of “no more favourable treatment”
which means that all shipping nations are treated equally [14,
p.689]. Nonetheless, efforts to reduce GHG and non-GHG emis-
sions may lead to signiﬁcant increases in transport costs and thus
drive positive externalities for ship owners to reduce fuel ex-
penditure and thus reduce emissions further. However, promising
options are always matched by barriers in the shipping industry
such as the industry's complexity, infrastructure lock-in and the
necessity for individualized vessel based interventions [35].
The IMO, a United Nations body working with maritime ship-
ping, has developed a protocol, namely, the International Conven-
tion for the Prevention of Pollution from Vessels (commonly known
as ‘MARPOL’). This is, by far, the most signiﬁcant legal instrument
worldwide covering all the relevant areas of shipping with speciﬁc
details [105, p.196]. It outlines the technology, which must be usede under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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criteria for vessels to ensure efﬁcient energy use. The United Na-
tions Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) details the sources
of marine pollution and the duties and responsibilities of states in
this area. Apart from these international instruments, there are
many other tools in place to regulate the marine environment and
pollution reduction, which have been adopted under the auspices
of the IMO and other global organizations.2 Unfortunately, none of
these instruments adequately focuses on shipping corporations'
accountability for effectively reducing vessel-sourced GHG emis-
sions. Parties to these instruments are the nation states. They
rarely dictate procedures for shipping corporations to reduce
vessels' GHG emissions. For instance, the MARPOL describes a
procedure for managing various sources of ship-generated pollu-
tion in its 6 annexes. Annexes I and II are about oil and chemical
induced pollution regulation and they are compulsory for the
states parties. There are some procedures to regulate air pollution
from marine vessels in Annex VI of this instrument, but im-
plementation of these procedures by states parties is optional.
Moreover, these procedures do not cover GHG emissions from
marine fossil fuels. Under this protocol, the control of shipping
emissions at the domestic level was passed to developed nations.
Thus, the reduction of emissions from international shipping is
facilitated by the developed nations working with the IMO.
Therefore, countries are largely responsible for their own terri-
torial waters. Unfortunately, most of them are reluctant to develop
policies and infrastructure to regulate the emissions issues perti-
nent to the vessels in their territorial waters.
The IMO is a member-states led organization and it requires
mandates from its members to be able to have policies on inter-
national shipping. Getting such mandates, however, is historically
a challenging task. Prior to the Kyoto Protocol's adoption in 1997,
the convention's Subsidiary Body on Technical Advice suggested
that the member states consider ﬁve options for effective control
of emissions from international shipping, but no decision was
made as agreement could not be reached on their importance.3
Nevertheless, negotiations are currently underway in the Marine
Environment Protection Committee of the IMO for the adoption of
a universal instrument for GHG emissions reduction from marine
vessels. Unfortunately, the way in which this negotiation process is
progressing does indicate that an instrument will not be im-
plemented in the near future. Likewise, even with the adoption of
the Kyoto Protocol (which imposes a legally binding emissions
reduction target only on the developed states), it is doubtful that
these states, as listed in the Annex I of the UNFCCC, will adopt any
GHG emissions reduction related instrument based on the CBDR
principle in the near future [53,55]. The 15th Conference of the
Parties of the UNFCCC approved a work plan for a binding in-
strument and this was due to be considered at the 60th Marine
Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) meeting. But no de-
cision was reached at the MEPC meeting [70,71]. That said, this
paper does not seek to undermine the CBDR principle, instead, it
proposes an alternative New Governance approach to improve
efﬁciencies in the vessel-sourced GHG emissions reduction reg-
ulatory framework at the international level [65,104].
None of the instruments within the current global regulatory
framework describe how large shipping corporations are to be
accountable for the reduction of their vessels' GHG emissions. We
propose holding global corporations accountable for their perfor-
mance to their wider stakeholders is a market-based mechanism
(MBM) and it has been proven to be effective in some industries to
enhance the responsible behaviour of large corporations that op-
erate in a highly competitive market with sensitive brand images.
One particular strength of this mechanism is that it can expose
corporations to the threat of losing their competitive edge in the
market. It can also allow consumers to pressure corporations to actresponsibly. These pressures or forces can be operational in var-
ious ways. The creation of a regulatory framework, which compels
corporations to disclose necessary information in an effective
manner, is becoming an increasingly popular method. Hence, the
way in which a shipping corporation delivers information on their
vessels’ GHG emissions to authorities, if not to the general public,
is vital for regulating vessel-sourced GHG emissions, in the ab-
sence of any particular international instrument.
Interestingly, academic literature on the global shipping cor-
porations' (such as Maersk or Mediterranean Shipping Lines) roles
in reducing their vessels GHG emission is negligible.4 This article is
an attempt to ﬁll this void. The remainder of this paper is as fol-
lows. The second section provides a brief deﬁnition of ‘account-
ability’ followed by discussions on shipping corporations' ac-
countability in the third section. Section, 4 discusses corporations'
accountability regulations. Having established that improving
shipping corporations' accountability is vital for reducing vessel-
sourced GHG emissions, the ﬁfth section of this paper critically
evaluates the current accountability practices of the top 10 global
shipping corporations. Section six assesses the current emissions
reduction mechanism, and permits GHG emissions reduction
performance disclosure as a MBM to improve shipping corpora-
tions' roles in the emissions regulation framework. Section seven
concludes the paper.2. Accountability
Before assessing the accountability regulation of the global
shipping corporations at the international level, a note on the
meaning of ‘accountability’ as used in this paper is important. It is
important in the sense that this word is ‘somewhat multi-faceted
and, indeed, a ‘murky’ term that does not lend itself to precise
deﬁnition’ ([19]; Sinclair, 1995). Although there is a distinct lack of
consensus within the socio-political, environmental and account-
ing domains as to its meaning, in general, ‘accountability’ denotes
‘the duty to provide an account (by no means necessarily a ﬁ-
nancial account) or reckoning of those actions for which one is
held responsible’ [19,36]. This is based on the principle-agent
theories where ‘an agent, who is the accountable actor, must an-
swer to the principle, who is the accounter’ ([3,66]; Ross, 1973).
Indeed, within the various meanings of ‘accountability’, there is a
trend to deﬁne this term from the perspective of one of the actors.
From the accounter's perspective, this term ‘addresses how the
accounter's goals can most effectively be achieved, or how the
accounter can inﬂuence the accountable one to achieve what the
accounter wants’ [3]. From the accountable's perspective, this term
focuses on how the accountable mechanism created mostly by the
accounter can psychologically and behaviorally impact the ac-
countable actor. Accordingly, studies that focus on the accounter
actor often explore mechanisms for clarifying goals to that actor,
and discuss ‘consequences for the accountable actor based on
success in achieving the accounters’ desires’ [3]. Studies on the
accountability of accountable actors focus on how these actors act
when they are held ‘accountable’ [68,106]. The underpinning of
these concepts is ‘the construction of individual moral worth and
the acknowledgement of that worth by the assignment of credit or
blame for individual actions’ [3]. As such, accountability will be
deﬁned as a concept within which credit and blame are deeply
entrenched and both the actors maintain relational transactions
that can ‘lead to increased efﬁciency, effectiveness and justice’
[3,87,88]. Edwards and Hulme deﬁne accountability as ‘the means
by which individuals and organizations report to a recognized
authority (or authorities) and are held responsible for their actions
(Edwards and Hulme, 1996, p. 967).
Accountability has both the elements of answerability and
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explanations of actions and reactions, enforceability refers to the
realization of that obligation and implementing sanctions in the
case of nonfulﬁllment. Taking into consideration these core com-
ponents, accountability regulation is designed to maintain a clear
understanding about the performances of corporations, to fulﬁll
the needs of stakeholders. When stakeholders deal with a cor-
poration, their interactions are guided by their perceptions of the
corporations, and not by what the corporation wants them to
perceive. Therefore, corporations need to be seen to be fulﬁlling
their commitments in the eyes of the stakeholders. One of the
ways to do so is by being transparent (Soobaroyen and Mahadeo,
2012, p.338). The pressure for corporations to be transparent
comes about through the publishing of information, so that in-
terested parties can evaluate whether the corporations are well on
track, or whether they need corrections. Therefore, the operational
deﬁnition of accountability, very often, becomes limited to re-
porting to the designated parties in which one party justiﬁes ac-
tions to another party, such as customers, investors and regulators
(Ebrahim, 2003; Tetlock, 1983).
There are varying opinions regarding to whom, and about
what, corporations are accountable. The degree of accountability
may be deﬁned by the number of relationships in an organization.
Researchers argue that accountability can be attributed to both
external and internal people (Cornwall et al., 2000) and it can be
ensured in either a formal or informal way (Edwards and Hulme,
1996, p. 967). While the formal mechanisms include, but are not
limited to, formal reporting, reward and punishment systems,
performance evaluation, and supervisory leadership training, in-
formal mechanisms include group norms, cultural norms, and
loyalty to the organization amongst others (Frink and Klimoski,
2004, p. 3).
This research focuses on the formal accountability to stake-
holders that shipping corporations have in reducing their GHG
emissions. This is important because currently shipping corpora-
tions, as a whole, do not have well-accepted accountability prac-
tices for GHG emissions reduction responsibilities. Indeed, whom
corporations should be accountable for their performance, is not
clear (see, for example, [75]). Evidence from other industry sectors
suggests that companies which display stronger Environmental
Management Systems and corporate governance tend to be larger
in size and use voluntary GHG disclosure to gain competitive ad-
vantage [92]. Nonetheless, GHG emission disclosures may also be
used as tools to legitimize environmentally sensitive companies in
the eyes of stakeholders (see, for example, [89]). In the shipping
industry more speciﬁcally, accountability mechanisms and ex-
ternal disclosure requirements are insufﬁciently dealt with in the
global regulatory framework for the reduction of vessel-sourced
GHG emissions.3. Shipping corporations' accountability regulation
Similar to the concept of accountability, the deﬁnition of reg-
ulation is unclear too, as it covers very broad areas of state control
over social and economic activities, including various forms of
unintentional and non-state actions [8,13,86]. Nonetheless, it is
widely accepted that regulation refers to anything that controls or
inﬂuences the activities in which society is an important aspect
[48,100]. Such control or inﬂuence is purported to prevent un-
desirable behaviour, actions and activities, and to enable and en-
courage desirable ones [7,9,31]. To this end, regulations may in-
clude policies, norms, market principles, business codes, interna-
tional principles and covenants designed to affect social and eco-
nomic behaviour and activities [81,115]. Accordingly, all law is
regulatory in nature [84].The aim of regulation varies with the objectives of regulators in
different contexts. One of the predominant aims of creating reg-
ulation is to render the behaviour of regulatees consistent with
market principles and widely-valued social norms by emphasising
greater efﬁciency and ﬂexibility in internal management. For this,
regulatory strategies are increasingly used to improve compliance
with environmental standards [47,52], the implementation of oc-
cupational health and safety guidelines [39,50,101], the involve-
ment of stakeholders, inclusion of equal opportunities [73,79],
ethical standards [24], and the adherence to principles of fair
competition in business and society [85].
The regulation on vessel-sourced GHG emissions reduction,
however, has never been considered to be straightforward [72,96].
For some time world leaders have been attempting to reach
agreement on this issue, but historically have failed [25,41]. Lea-
ders believe that the positions they should hold are dependent on
whether they are from developed or developing states, and sub-
sequently, cannot agree on which actor in the global ocean based
cargo shipment chain should assume what proportion of ac-
countability [90]. Within these limitations, the IMO continues to
work to ensure that the shipping industry abides by responsible
business practices, by designing various guidelines [45].
As mentioned earlier, the MARPOL is a signiﬁcant instrument,
which has been developed by the IMO. Though the regulatory
framework described in the MARPOL is considered to be favour-
able by many, implementation of the procedures and standards
mentioned in it has become a major challenge. Shipping is a very
complex business involving stakeholders both on land and in the
water. To add to the complexity, these stakeholders come from
different states and are subject to different laws, values, norms,
and cultures. In this business, shipping corporations and their
vessels may be registered in different states. Vessels will use ports
across many states, and crewmembers may be from other states
again. Ships will also travel through the waters of other states as
well as international waters.
This means that there is large-scale diversity in trade, and it is
not easy to govern all shipping trade under one scheme. The ﬁrst
challenge encountered with the introduction of the MARPOL was
during ratiﬁcation; not every nation state agreed to ratify all of the
annexes. For example, the United States recognizes all annexes but
Annex IV [20, p.8]. Another problem became evident with the
ambiguity of the convention and the slow rate of cooperation by
the affected parties. Under the MARPOL convention, a vessel can
be inspected by the hosting state for emissions levels or any en-
vironmental violations. If the emissions level is higher than the
acceptable range, the country can detain the ship. But when the
vessel is in water that does not belong to any jurisdiction or it is
not possible to determine the jurisdiction, the responsibility goes
to the ﬂag state (the state where the vessel has been registered).
Historical records show that the cooperation that is required in the
second case is weak and the response from ﬂag states is poor [20,
p.9].
The foresight of the IMO regarding shipping corporations' ac-
countability for GHG emissions reduction performance can be
questioned too. This organization keeps its activities limited to the
rights and responsibilities of the state parties. It does not suggest
that its members focus on shipping corporations' responsibility for
GHG emissions reduction. It has even hesitated, several times, to
deﬁne a common standard for measuring emissions from the
vessels. For instance, in the determination of acceptable ranges for
sulphur emissions, this organization has frequently changed its
position. Though the world average was in between 2.5% and 3.5%,
the IMO ﬁxed a global cap of 4.5% for sulphur emissions. This has
been criticized for not being sufﬁciently stringent. The EU was so
critical of the ﬁgure that it decided on a smaller cap of 1% within
the EU zone [59].7 The IMO later made amendments and reduced
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2012.8 This later change to reduce the cap on sulphur emissions
demonstrates that the IMO has been working on a trial and error
basis with regional politics inﬂuencing its policy design process. In
its Resolution 963/23, this organization called upon its members to
adopt a market based instrument for the reduction of vessel-
sourced GHG emissions. However, 10 years after the adoption of
this resolution, and more than a decade after the adoption of the
Kyoto Protocol, it is still struggling to reach a conclusion on the
type of this instrument ([58,63,14,61]).
Indeed, it is difﬁcult for the IMO to create a single point of unity
considering the diversiﬁed nature of the shipping business [102].
Differing economic conditions across member states is also of
importance. Member states with strong economies are generally
the states of origin of the top global shipping corporations. Like-
wise, some of these states are the major contributors to global
GHG emissions. Almost all of these states are reluctant to have any
policies that differentiate between the obligations of the devel-
oped and developing states. However, developing state members
tend to display a reluctance to implement any speciﬁc emissions
reduction commitments. Compounding this never ending problem
is the obstacles, which are evident in the implementation of any
protocol in developing states. This is another reason for a lack of
global policy on vessel-sourced GHG emissions reduction. Devel-
oping states do not have enough resources to implement these
kinds of protocols, and their control over the activities of global
corporations is negligible. They have neither the equipment to
implement the protocol nor the ﬁnancing to afford the required
equipment. These states often request ﬁnancial support from de-
veloped states, and this continues to be a point of contention.
Unfortunately, the IMO have not developed any guidelines in this
area.
Article 207 of UNCLOS details responsibilities for the states to
establish global and regional rules, standards and practices for
controlling pollution of the marine environment from land-based
sources, ‘taking into account characteristic regional features, the
economic capacity of developing states and their need for eco-
nomic development.’ According to Article 211(1) and 212(3) of the
UNCLOS, the state parties are responsible for establishing global
rules and recommended practices and procedures for preventing
vessel-sourced marine pollution. They are also obligated to assist
international agencies like the IMO. However, there does not seem
to be any kind of ﬁrm commitment by the states in this area, and
this has also resulted in the lack of proper accountability practices
by shipping corporations. In the ﬁrst week of December 2014,
representatives from 195 states gathered in Lima for two weeks to
discuss climate change policies that are scheduled to be approved
in the Paris meeting in late 2015 [72]. They discussed the policy
terms and wordings, and it was reported throughout the media
that no platform was unanimously agreed upon [5,46,83, p.6].
While the USA, China, and the European Union commit to their
emissions reductions, other important nations, such as Canada,
Australia, Japan, Russia, South Africa, Brazil and Indonesia have not
made their positions clear.
All of this means that there has been a notable under-
development of global policy to facilitate the active reduction of
vessel-sourced GHG emissions. For the shipping business, the
problem with the current GHG emissions reduction regulation
framework is that it does not place emphasis on the development
of self-regulated accountability practices. The IMO has no policy,
let alone any speciﬁc procedure, for the development of criteria for
corporate design of emissions reduction related activities. Like-
wise, none of the international organizations working on en-
vironmental pollution reduction have policies to assess corporate
performance in GHG emissions reduction for the shipping trade.
This has a serious impact on vessel-sourced GHG emissionsreduction programs. According to a scientiﬁc study, ‘by 2050, in
the absence of policies, vessels’ emissions may grow by 150% to
250% (compared to emissions in 2007) as a result of the growth in
shipping' [56,62].4. GHG emissions and the accountability practices of the major
shipping corporations
Measuring the amount of carbon emissions from sea vessels is a
difﬁcult task. This is mainly due to the complexities in emissions
measurement methods, rather than the fact that the vessels are
usually located in deep ocean waters. There are many methods for
this measurement and frequently, the results based on these
methods do not match each other [74]. For instance, Corbett and
Köhler [21], Endresen et al. and Eyring, Köhler, Van Aardenne, &
Lauer estimated emissions based on fuel consumption, but did not
get the same results [16,30,33]. To carry goods, shipping lines
consume fossil fuels, the by-products of which are the main
sources of emissions. There are two types of emissions that are
produced from the consumption of fossil fuels: GHG emissions and
non-GHG emissions. While carbon dioxide (CO2) is the main
component [91] of GHG emissions, non-GHG emissions include
sulphur oxides (SOx), nitrogen oxides (NOx), and particulate
matter (PM). The emission of CO2 comes from two different types
of activities: port related and en route activities. Port related ac-
tivities include entering or leaving a port along with activities
relating to vessels’ staying in their berth. En route activities refer to
methods of speed reduction and the cruise phase in the open
ocean. In almost every case, en route related activities produce the
maximum amount of carbon emissions [45]. Among non-GHG
emissions, SOx receives the most signiﬁcant attention (after CO2)
due to its negative effect on the environment.
Researchers usually estimate data on vessel-sourced CO2
emissions based on different parameters, like the vessels' engine
power, amount of fuel used, and number of days at sea. In the
absence of a commonly agreed single method to estimate the
volume of emissions, corporations are entrusted to provide data
based on the ﬁgures generated by their own choice and method. In
addition to that, while at sea, vessels do not report their speeds
and routes [45], both of which have a positive correlation with the
amount of carbon emitted [91]. New methods are being developed
to better monitor individual ship emissions using Automatic
Identiﬁcation System data for example [109]. However, these
methods are not widely adopted in practice yet.
To gain a better understanding of current accountability and
reporting practices in the global shipping industry, the section
below assesses the environmental disclosures of the leading global
shipping corporations. It ﬁrst explains the sample of the disclosure
documents; secondly, methods for analyzing these documents;
and ﬁnally, the results of this analysis.
4.1. Sample size
The section below assesses the levels of CO2 emissions from the
top 10 shipping corporations of the world and their emissions
reduction performance related accountability practices. Shipping
corporations deliver their accountability information in various
ways, among which their annual report is the ﬂagship document.
We assessed the Annual reports of the 10 largest shipping cor-
porations for 5 years starting from 2009 were assessed.
The above top 10 corporations were selected based on the
ranking produced by alphaliner.com. The ranking has been cross
checked with other rankings produced by insidermonkey.com,
supplychaindigital.com, and therichest.com. Most of the available
rankings agree with the ranking of alphaliner.com. Among these
Table 1
Ranking of shipping lines by alphaliner.com.
Rank Operator TEU Capacity Market Share
1 Maersk Line 2,921,125 15.50%
2 Mediterranean Shipping Company S.A. 2,550,147 13.60%
3 CMA CGM Group 1,628,269 8.70%
4 Hapag – Lloyd 965,168 5.10%
5 Evergreen Marine Corporation 948,220 5.00%
6 China Ocean Shipping Container Line 819,429 4.40%
7 The China Shipping Container Lines 656,050 3.50%
8 Hanjin Shipping Company 608,459 3.20%
9 Mitsui O.S.K. Lines 604,720 3.20%
10 The American President Lines 562,346 3.00%
Table 2
Shipping corporations with relevant reports online (✓¼ Yes, X¼No).
Corporation Annual
Report
Sustainability Report Period
Maersk Line ✓ ✓ 2009 –
2013
Mediterranean Shipping
Company S.A.
X X
CMA CGM Group ✓ X 2013a
Hapag - Lloyd ✓ X 2010–2013
Evergreen Marine
Corporation
✓ X 2009–2013
China Ocean Shipping Con-
tainer Line
✓ ✓ 2009–
2013b
The China Shipping Con-
tainer Lines
✓ ✓c 2009–2013
Hanjin Shipping Company ✓ X 2009–2013
Mitsui O.S.K. Lines ✓ X 2009–2013
The American President
Lines
✓ X 2009–2013
a only the 2013 annual report is available online
b some of their sustainability reports cannot be accessed online. They also do
not regularly publish sustainability reports
c all sustainability reports are in Chinese
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privately owned and CMA-CGM has only one annual report on its
webpage. Therefore, these two ﬁrms have been excluded, reducing
the ﬁnal sample size to eight.
4.2. Methods for content analysis
The research applied a content analysis technique to collect
data from the annual reports of the selected shipping corporations.
The ﬁrst stage of this analysis was the selection of the recording
units to be coded in the analysis. The second stage was the se-
lection of the unit of measurement (or enumeration) with which
to quantify the results [22]. Units included in this content analysis
are the number of words [26,27], number of sentences [108],
number of pages [23], percentage of pages [112] and percentage of
total disclosure [110]. The codes were tested on sample annual
reports to develop the ﬁnal coding instrument. To enhance the
reliability of the coding instrument, a test was employed to un-
dertake a proportion of the content analysis task, with a view to
later examining the amount of intercoder agreement. The coding
instrument and instructions were reﬁned until a high level of
agreement was achieved. This approach is a better indication of
the reliability of the data than a pre-test/ post-test as ‘it is sensitive
to more than the internal noise or inconsistencies of one coder'
[22,64]. The qualitative content analysis adopted in this paper
enables a richer understanding of the way in which individual
shipping corporations are approaching accountability towards
GHG emissions in their operations. Annual reports are used as a
mechanism by which to understand the level to which shipping
corporations disclose information on their GHG performance.
Thus, it provides some measure of the extent to which shipping
corporations are be willing to be accountable and held to account
by stakeholders.
4.3. Results
The aim of this content analysis was to understand the trend in
global shipping corporations’ environmental disclosure practices,
with a particular focus on the frequency of their disclosures, GHG
emissions reduction commitments and performances, and the
overall importance of environmental issues in their internal reg-
ulations. This analysis explicated that (i) most of the top 10 global
shipping corporations do not have an accountability practice of
regularly disclosing their sustainability performances to their
stakeholders and, (ii) they do not disclose GHG emissions reduc-
tion related information adequately in their annual reports. Below
is a discussion on these two results.
4.3.1. Corporations do not publish their accounts
Shipping corporations around the world have diverse dis-
closure practices. Some corporations publish both annual and
sustainability reports while others publish an annual report only.
Among the selected shipping corporations, the Mediterranean
Shipping Company neither publishes its annual reports, nor are its
budgets veriﬁable. (Table 1).
The China Shipping Container Lines has an interesting practice;
the company publishes its annual report in English, but its sus-
tainability report in Chinese. CMA CGM Group has only one annual
report available online. Hapag - Lloyd has all but their 2009 annual
report online. Table 2 below is the summary of publishing prac-
tices by major shipping lines in the world.
Only 3 out of 10 shipping corporations publish a sustainability
report, meaning that generally there is a poor level of reporting.
Remarkably, the sustainability report produced by The China
Shipping Container Lines is written only in Chinese Mandarin
meaning that only Chinese speakers can understand the reportand other stakeholders are left in the dark. This leaves only two
companies, Maersk Line and COSCOL, which disclose sufﬁcient
sustainability related information for global stakeholders.
4.3.2. Disclosure on CO2 emissions is very poor
All eight shipping lines have annual reports available on their
webpages for the period of 2009–2013 except Hapag – Lloyd which
has annual reports for 2010 – 2013. In the ﬁrst stage, with Nvivo,
all annual reports have been analyzed to ﬁnd out how many times
they discuss ‘carbon emission’. Results from this step were then
manually checked against annual reports to ﬁnd any repetition or
out of context mentions. For example, if ‘carbon emission’ is
mentioned in the table of contents, it is not calculated. A similar
method was used regarding repetition to calculate the actual
mentioning of the words in the annual reports.
The Evergreen Marine Corporation does not mention carbon or
emission or carbon emission in their annual reports. Therefore, it
has been excluded from further analysis. The results of analysis for
the remaining seven companies are presented in Fig. 1.
The ﬁgure shows that overall reporting on carbon emission is
very poor. Shipping corporations publish basic information on
carbon emissions and they do not follow any predictable pattern,
let alone a common pattern, for this information. Some corpora-
tions, for example, CSCL and Hanjin SC, ignore carbon emission
issues in their annual reports quite visibly. CSCL did not discuss the
carbon emission issue in its 2009 and 2010 annual reports while
Hanjin SC ignored carbon emission issues in its 2011, 2012, and
2013 annual reports. Their discussion on carbon emission is
Fig. 1. Frequency of ‘carbon emission’ discussion during 2009–13.
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In the second stage, in another manual check, the annual re-
ports of seven corporations were examined to reveal how many
pages (approximately) shipping corporations allocated to offer
information about carbon emissions, sustainability, and other en-
vironmental concerns in 2013.
The approximate number of pages presenting the environ-
mental concerns of shipping corporations was then compared
with the total page numbers of the annual reports to discern the
percentage of environmental issue coverage for the seven cor-
porations. The maximum coverage, which is still poor at 4.46%, is
found within reporting by Mitsui O.S.K. Lines. Environmental
coverage and the frequency of carbon emission discussion in 2013
are presented in Fig. 2.
This study demonstrates that reporting on environmental is-
sues by shipping corporations in their annual reports is very low.
The top 10 shipping corporations do not place emphasis on en-
vironmental reporting. They report basic matters, but do not dis-
cuss the cost of CO2 emissions, how much money they invest in
technological development to minimize carbon emissions, their
strategic plan to invest in an alternative to fossil fuels, and how
their carbon emissions impact on their stakeholders. Some cor-
porations express their concern for the environment in a limited
way, but do not give further details on what actions they will take
on issues such as carbon emissions.
The above analysis of the annual reports of the world's top
eight shipping corporations suggests that: (a) the world's largest
shipping corporations do not publish sufﬁcient information in
their accounts, (b) they publish very little on their carbon emis-
sions, and (c) the amount of carbon emissions cannot be calculated
from the data available in their annual reports. For instance, on
their website, the Maersk Line claims that they have reduced CO2
emissions by 3.8 million tonnes in 2013 and two-thirds of total
CO2 emissions from their vessels since 2007.9 However, in their
annual reports, this corporation rarely provides data on their CO2
emissions reduction for a particular year, let alone disclosures by
vessel. Therefore, due to the lack of categorized data in the yearly
reports, it is almost impossible for a stakeholder to verify theFig. 2. Shipping corporations' concern about the environment and carbon emission
in 2013.above claim mentioned on its website and review the nature of
carbon emissions at each company.
Also, in annual reports, there is not sufﬁcient environmental
information based on which stakeholders can perform an analysis,
and further, hold corporations liable for their misdeeds, if any.
Thus, as deﬁned earlier, accountability cannot be discharged
without appropriate information upon which reward and pun-
ishment can be realized. Accountability is therefore compromised
regarding environmental reporting by these corporations. How-
ever, it is acknowledged that the publishing of a sustainability
report alone does not necessarily mean the accomplishment of
accountability [1,2,80].
Published accounts by shipping corporations on carbon emis-
sions provide nothing more than a discussion on corporations’
overall carbon strategy, what actions corporations have already
taken and their plan to implement carbon reduction. These ac-
counts merely signal recognition to the corporation for their car-
bon reduction activities. The reporting by shipping corporations is
neither in a uniform format nor in a user-friendly format such as
the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI).10 They also know that with
the increase in the publication of emissions statistics, regulators
will introduce tougher sanctions that will make their businesses
more expensive to run and reduce proﬁt [107,114]. This might
motivate them to hide or manipulate emissions data [12,51].
Hence, the information value to users of these reports remains
limited and creates a gap between the perceived reporting and the
performance expectation [1,22]. Also, it creates room for doubt ‘as
to whether reporting reﬂected performance…would not be toler-
ated in ﬁnancial reporting’. In the absence of either legal regula-
tion or market based regulation for this reporting practice, it is
likely that such disclosures will continue to be incomplete, in-
consistent and lack comparability [22].5. Improving the accountability practices of shipping cor-
porations for reducing vessel-sourced GHG emissions
In the regulation landscape, improving responsibility perfor-
mances through effective corporate accountability practices is a
comparatively new approach, in which different forms of regula-
tions regulate one another. It is based on the precepts of New
Governance, which encourage different actors and factors to work
together within regulatory strategies designed to reach a public
policy goal [93]. This approach attempts to link social values to
economic incentives and disincentives, and it indirectly inﬂuences
corporations to incorporate social responsibility principles
through self-regulation [28,40]. It could help regulators create a
more socially responsible corporate culture, as corporations would
then be in a stronger position to persuade management to em-
brace the ethos of this notion in their core strategies. This section
argues that holding shipping corporations accountable to their
consumers for their roles and performances on air pollution and
its reduction is a viable market based mechanism for the reduction
of vessel-sourced GHG emissions. These corporations must be
accountable for this by regularly disclosing information on their
emissions reduction performance to their consumers and reg-
ulators. A global instrument or an inclusion of a duty to disclose
this information in the national legislation of the states that own
most of the leading shipping corporations could be an effective
way to compel these corporations to make such disclosures.
Requiring reports on GHG emissions reduction performance is
a comparatively new and popular MBM for improving corporate
accountability. There could be various ways, other than the use of
laws, to hold corporations accountable to stakeholders [17]. A code
of conduct prepared by the industry, incentives from the govern-
ment, and pressure from constituents can also make corporations
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sions reduction performances (the development of Monitoring,
Reporting and Veriﬁcation [MRV] system by the European Union
as such a mechanism will be discussed below). Governments can
also encourage corporations to make such disclosures by providing
fast-tracking in the granting of permissions, scheduling inspec-
tions less frequently, offering tax breaks and by providing public
recognition to reward businesses that demonstrate commitment
to speciﬁc social values in their internal regulations [38]. To take
advantage of these incentives, corporations would then develop
suitable internal systems to demonstrate their social commitment.
The application of such strategies through laws could encourage
corporations to take systematic action to be competitive in the
market and assist external stakeholders to reach their individual
goals. For instance, a law that requires corporations to include
information on their energy consumption into their annual reports
could trigger a series of actions by both the corporation and its
constituents. Essentially, this will enhance dialogue and reﬂexivity
between corporations and stakeholders that will strengthen ac-
countability and could lead to reductions in GHG emissions.
To become compliant by disclosing information on emissions
reduction performances, corporations also need to have plans in
place to reduce emissions from their vessels. Documented plans
and results would assist audit or tax authorities to calculate a re-
bate or ﬁne for each corporation as appropriate. This information
could also be used by the media to expose corporations which are
not improving their performance, again encouraging them to be-
come more energy efﬁcient.
There is legislation capable of holding corporations accountable
for their performance on emissions reduction. For example, Aus-
tralia passed the National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act
2007 after the ratiﬁcation of the Kyoto Protocol. Under this legis-
lation, corporations are required to report GHG emissions, energy
production and consumption and other information related to
their performance on emissions reduction to the Greenhouse and
Energy Reporting Ofﬁce [22]. However, most of the states heavily
involved in the global shipping business are not subject to legis-
lation such as this. While there is a growing movement to impose
this kind of disclosure responsibility on corporations in general in
the developed economies, regulating the responsibilities of cor-
porations for vessel-sourced emissions remains untouched.
One of the reasons for this could be the difﬁculty in estab-
lishing the relationship between the vessel and its actual owner
[37]. A huge number of vessels operate under the ﬂag of con-
venience and this allows the real owner of GHG emitting vessels to
easily disguise their identity [6,97]. Another reason is that the
states that provide registration to vessels, as separate legal entities,
have no actual control over the registered vessels, which may
seldom or never visit their territory [58].11 Hence these states do
not have any incentive for enforcing disclosure provisions on the
vessels carrying their ﬂags. It is worth mentioning here that the
major shipping corporations do not heavily depend on the ‘ﬂag of
convenience’ strategy for their vessels’ registration. Maersk Line,
for instance, has 580 vessels and most of these are registered in
Denmark – the home country of this corporation. A good number
of vessels of this corporation are registered in some developed
states like the USA, UK, Singapore, but almost none of their vessels
are registered in Liberia or Panama or Vanuatu.
It seems that the current global regulatory framework for re-
ducing vessel-sourced GHG emissions is based on the develop-
ment of theories necessary for calculating the consumption of fuel
by the vessels. It also relies on the estimation of emissions from
fuel consumption data. The IMO started working in 1948 as a body
of the United Nations and is entrusted with the development of
regulations and standards pertaining to the safety and environ-
mental impacts of international shipping. The institution has noenforcement power; the responsibility of enforcement of regula-
tions and standards developed by the IMO rests with national
authorities [10, p.62]; [34, p.454]. However, the IMO has been
successful in improving standards of environmental protection
[76]. The IMO made it compulsory for all vessels built after 1 Jan-
uary 2013 to comply with the Energy Efﬁciency Design Index
(EEDI). The major purpose of this index is to encourage efﬁcient
energy use and allow for the calculation of carbon emission. EEDI
allows vessels to achieve minimum level energy efﬁciency. It cal-
culates the amount of carbon emissions from the design of the
vessels and the data on the performance of the vessels’ engines
[94].
The EU, with a long term target to reduce carbon emissions by
40–50% of its 2005 level by 2050, adopted a regulation framework
on monitoring, reporting, and veriﬁcation (MRV) which became
effective from July 1, 2015. Once this regulation is in effect, all large
vessels entering ports within EU jurisdiction from January 2018
must have a veriﬁed emissions report.12 This is expected to result
in up to a 2% reduction in emissions compared to a business as
usual situation, lead to signiﬁcant cost savings for ship owners and
enable detailed monitoring of individual ships’ performance. Pre-
sently, an expert consultation process is underway to clarify as-
sistance to help companies meet proposed regulations, deﬁne
veriﬁcation rules and set up an accreditation process. Despite the
inroads made, the MEPC President noted the importance of the
MRV scheme in the 68th session of the group. In particular, the
Secretary General voiced reservations about differing monitoring
standards and the implications that this may have for the integrity
of the IMO as an international standard setting body [57]. Parti-
cularly, if international standards surpassed the IMO developed
frameworks. Indeed, the IMO worked actively to outline key focus
areas in order to “remain relevant and respond in an appropriate
and timely manner” to the Paris Agreement which included the
adoption of a global MRV system (MPEC, 26 February 2016). MPEC
realizes the impetus to ﬁnalise its MRV standards quickly although
debates remain strong about the level of detail and secrecy that
some within the IMO are demanding (MPEC, 26 February 2016).
Current EU MRV regulation excludes small emitters (vessels below
5000 gross tons) from its scope as it is only applicable to vessels
above 5000 gross tons.13 Vessels entering and leaving must have a
veriﬁcation certiﬁcate detailing their carbon emissions and a fail-
ure to carry this document more than once can result in an ex-
pulsion order for the ship [11]. Once in effect, the regulation is
expected to produce an accurate reading of carbon emissions by
vessels.
Regulations and standards formulated by the IMO and the EU
may contribute to efforts to reduce carbon emissions, however the
signiﬁcance of these reductions is debated [14]. But this legal
framework is not sufﬁcient to ensure the total accountability of the
parties responsible for this emission. Major issues in carbon re-
lated accountability of shipping corporations originate from the
methods used to calculate the ‘consumption of fuel’. The formula
that is frequently used to calculate the amount of carbon emis-
sions, amount of carbon emission ¼ amount of consumed fuel x
emission factor, clearly shows that one has to focus on the amount
of fuel consumed rather than the emission factor which is ﬁxed by
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and which de-
pends on the type of fuel used. Increase in the consumption of fuel
will increase the amount of carbon emission and vice versa. Ac-
cordingly, to reduce carbon emissions, it is important to minimize
the use of fuel by increasing efﬁciency in fuel consumption. If
vessels are efﬁcient in fuel consumption, the amount of CO2
emission decreases. It means that there is a negative relationship
between efﬁciency in fuel consumption and the amount of carbon
emissions. Therefore, ‘fuel consumption’ is the focal point in both
the reduction and calculation of carbon emissions. So, the very
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of a policy framework to control carbon emissions is the devel-
opment of an accountability practice on the calculation of the
amount of fuel that has been consumed.
The calculation of the amount of consumed fuel is very difﬁcult
at all stages and very often shipping corporations estimate the
amount based on activity or output. The IMO, in their 2009 report,
recognizes two methods of calculating fuel consumption: the ac-
tivity based method and fuel statistics [54, p.24]. They opine that
the ﬁrst method represents a more accurate picture of fuel con-
sumption, but it is not one hundred percent accurate. The method
requires large volumes of data that are not available at a certain
point in time [54, p.24]. In such a situation, someone may consider
the use of a Bunker Delivery Note (BDN) as an effective tool for
measuring fuel consumption by the vessels. It is like the common
management accounting process: fuel at the beginning þ delivery
during the period - fuel at the end. The success with the formula
depends on the accurate recording at each of the three stages:
beginning, end, and delivery point. While proposing a new reg-
ulation on monitoring, reporting, and carbon emission veriﬁcation
following this implementation of this method in the European
Union, it has been argued that there is no data to indicate the
precise amount of CO2 and other GHG emissions because of the
lack of monitoring and reporting mechanisms [32, p.3].
This opens up the potential for problems in an emissions re-
duction regulatory framework. What happens if someone makes
either intentional or unintentional errors in recording in any of the
fuel consumption calculation stages? Misrepresentation at any
stage will change the total calculation followed by inaccurate
carbon emissions reporting. Such an action would jeopardize the
success of the policies designed to mitigate the negative effects of
pollution. Similar problems remain with the regulatory framework
proposed by the EU. As per the regulation, shipping corporations
design a monitoring plan, instruct their vessels to measure and
record emissions, and submit the emissions report to the
authority.14 The submitted report is then veriﬁed by the third
party veriﬁer,15 who is independent of the company and operator,
by comparing the estimated emissions against the reported
emissions. The estimation is produced based on the vessels’
tracking data and characteristics. In the veriﬁcation process, if any
unexpected abnormality regarding carbon emissions is detected,
shipping corporations are responsible for providing a proper
explanation.
Developing accurate mechanical devices and technical equa-
tions are vital for measuring emissions of ships. They are an im-
portant part of the emissions reduction regulation framework. In
particular, the EEDI and the SEEMP are potentially strong con-
tributors to this framework. These procedures, however, came into
force only on 1 January 2013 and it will be some years before their
effectiveness can be evaluated [11,29]. Moreover, as discussed
earlier, these procedures alone are not sufﬁcient for effective re-
duction of vessel-sourced GHG emissions [102]. Recent initiatives
as a result of the Paris Agreement have increased pressure on the
international shipping industry to reach peak CO2 emissions as
early as possible before aiming for a complete elimination of
emissions (IMO, 26 February 2016). As a consequence, the IMO and
MPEC consider resolutions at the 69th session of MPEC will “be a
litmus test of the IMO and its Member States’ determination to
play a meaningful role in the ﬁght against climate change” (MPEC,
26 February 2016). This is due to the rapid growth of international
seaborne trade and political disparities amongst the states. In this
juncture, along with the current initiatives, the global framework
for GHG emissions reduction regulation should be enhanced with
some speciﬁc market based mechanisms (MBMs).
Recently, the international community has turned to MBMs to
explore their effectiveness in the possible reduction of GHGemissions resulting from anthropogenic activities [69,103]. MBMs
generally refer to the mechanisms based on the market principles
and practices which economically bind a market actor to perform
a certain act [42,43]. In the global shipping industry regulatory
framework, these mechanisms are regarded as supplements to the
technical and operational measures to reduce vessel-sourced GHG
emissions [90]. The IMO is trying to promote the awareness of the
creation and application of different MBMs for this industry. In
2009 it commissioned a study – the Scientiﬁc Study on Interna-
tional Shipping and Market-Based Instruments (Scientiﬁc Study)
and established a group of experts to study the feasibility of this
mechanism for this industry.
The MBMs currently under discussion can be divided into three
groups: (a) environmental fees, (b) tradable permit schemes and
(c) liability rules.17 The core of these mechanisms is that they can
assist regulators to make shipping corporations internalize the
cost of GHG emissions from their vessels, without mandating any
command and control type legal regulation. Reducing GHG emis-
sions by improving global shipping corporations’ accountability for
their vessels' emissions reduction performances is a hybrid type of
market based mechanism. Of the seven MBM proposals put for-
ward by the IMO, the efﬁciency incentive scheme, ship efﬁciency
and credit trading, and rebate mechanisms are also similar. It is not
the aim of this paper to compare these mechanisms. Indeed, there
is no single MBM that can provide solutions for different problems.
In practice some issues might need a mix of two or three types of
MBMs and there is no MBM without any problems [69]. The above
three types of MBMs contain some fundamental ﬂaws. The efﬁ-
ciency incentive scheme and ship efﬁciency and credit trading are
based on the EEDI and this has made these mechanisms less at-
tractive. As discussed earlier, a low EEDI may indicate high energy
efﬁciency, but this does not mean that a vessel performed well in
GHG emissions reduction. A vessel with a low EEDI may emit more
GHG than a vessel with a larger engine (high EEDI), ‘which it needs
to maintain certain speed to ensure safety in the bad weather’
[90,102].’ Another difﬁculty with these MBMs is that they are
meant for both new and old vessels, whereas the application of the
EEDI is limited to new vessels.19 These MBMs are not fully in op-
eration and so far there has been no study conducted on the
possible effects of these mechanisms in the international shipping
industry. In these circumstances, it is an arduous task for the IMO
to propose a deﬁnite decision on these MBMs, as the aim of this
international organization is to ‘encourage the removal of dis-
criminatory actions and unnecessary restrictions by Governments
affecting shipping engaged in international trade so as to promote
the availability of shipping services to the commerce of the world
without discrimination.’20 Exactly how the IMO can balance their
aims against proposals to help reduce carbon emissions remains to
be seen. This point is particularly salient because of the strong
targets to maintain global climate change below the 2 °C max-
imum limit discussed in the Paris Agreement. Current measures
have been argued as inadequate with immediate reevaluation of
the industry's response needed in order to achieve climate change
targets [4,15].
Improving global shipping corporations' accountability, by
compelling them to disclose information regarding their GHG
emissions reduction performance is a market based mechanism,
where the shipping corporations are almost bound to perform a
certain act in a more efﬁcient way than their competitors in the
global shipping market. The global shipping market is highly
competitive, and if a corporation is not careful, a loss of market
value is likely. Consumers (and especially constituents) of these
shipping corporations also have a role to play in indirectly insist-
ing that business activities are carried out in a particular manner.
Insisting that corporations disclose their GHG emissions reduction
performance is one act that can encourage competition among
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science and goodwill in the market, they will gain the trust of their
constituents and consumers and secure greater market share. The
costs of such disclosure practices can be offset by the beneﬁts that
can be earned from an extended share in the market. Increasing
the levels of civil society pressure, incentives from government
and greater constituent awareness can also compel shipping cor-
porations to report on fuel type, fuel consumption and the tech-
nology used to reduce emissions from fuel consumption by their
vessels. Once a corporation is consistently reporting in this area,
competitors will be bound to do the same, and will strive to im-
prove the reporting process. This new competition in better and
more effective reporting would ultimately push corporations to
invest more in actual GHG emissions reduction. This would also
assist consumers, constituents and regulators to assess the worth
of any given corporation and make good decisions about future
business with them.
As such, the Conference of Parties to the UNFCCC and the IMO
should consider strategies to improve the GHG emissions dis-
closure practices of global shipping corporations. Effective and
adequate disclosure is a way to ensure accountability for a parti-
cular responsibility. High standards of accountability practices can
also allow corporations to improve their ability to perform better
in reducing GHG emissions from their vessels [77,90,95]. If ne-
cessary, the IMO can extend its work with the International Or-
ganization for Standardization to formulate a disclosure guideline
on GHG emissions reduction performance for the international
shipping industry [60].6. Conclusion
The current regulatory framework that exists to assist shipping
corporations to address issues related to the impact of their ves-
sels' GHG emissions on global climate change is seen to be woe-
fully inadequate. Within the global GHG emissions reduction fra-
mework, all the regulatory modes are predominantly state centric.
Unfortunately, different states are not cohesive; they have failed to
prepare any comprehensive mechanism through which shipping
corporations are effectively included in the framework.
Conventions such as United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS) Article 207, 211, and 212 (discussed on page 7)
provided the rule which gives responsibility for vessel-sourced
GHG emissions reduction to the developed states. However, out of
the top 10 global shipping corporations, seven are owned either by
the developed states or the citizens of these states. Arguably, so far
these states have managed to avoid the worst impacts of GHG
emissions on the environment compared to developing countries
in Asia and the Paciﬁc. Hence, it seems that they are reluctant to
impose any international instrument on global shipping corpora-
tions' roles in vessel-sourced emissions reduction. This is further
evidenced by the debates taking place at International Maritime
Organization about the necessity to disclose detailed data of ship
emissions based on ‘real’ data and not proxies, and the sensitivity
of increased transparency.
Improving the environmental accountability of global shipping
corporations can contribute to the reduction of vessel-sourced
GHG emissions. Accountability practice recognizes that the moti-
vation, standards and even monitoring and enforcement systems
for responsibility do not depend only on international instru-
ments. Rather, accountability practice assists corporations to de-
sign their own compliance management systems according to
their speciﬁc circumstances in the market. Shipping corporations
can then present their performance standards in their disclosure
documents. Industry codes of conduct, private standards, compe-
tition and incentives can strongly motivate corporations toeffectively report on their social and environmental impacts and
ethical performance. To fulﬁll reporting requirements, the man-
agement team of ships can be encouraged to create internal po-
licies regarding emissions reduction and collection of information.
Corporate management may then use this information to adopt
strategies for managing any risks identiﬁed during the emissions
reduction and information collection process. This is essential for
corporations that are required to report on their vessels’ emissions
reduction performances. Their reports would also enable business
constituents and consumers to exert pressure on corporations to
perform better than their competitors and reduce emissions even
further.
Due to the complexities of shipping trade and the difﬁculties
involved in regulating this business, a comprehensive and gen-
erally acceptable regulatory framework on corporate responsibility
for reducing GHG emissions is unlikely to be achieved soon. In fact,
emissions are continuing to increase. Under these circumstances,
it is necessary for the states, the shipping industry and global or-
ganizations to explore and discuss MBMs for vessel-sourced GHG
emissions reduction. There is no point waiting for the develop-
ment of a comprehensive international instrument; current mea-
sures are not encouraging change quickly enough.
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